ntain, in Cape Town, is the conspicuous example. After
a few hundred yards of gentle acclivity through open ground a wood is
reached, near which is a homestead called Smith's Farm. Half way
between the wood and the top is a stone wall supporting a terrace.
Between the wood and this wall the ground is steep, broken and rocky.
Immediately above the wall the terrace, though easy, is wide and open,
and consequently exposed. The terrace crossed, the remainder of the
ascent is almost perpendicular; a matter therefore of strenuous
climbing under fire.

It appears from this description that the wood and the terrace
afforded a certain amount of cover, as did the donga; that the first
rush from the latter could be made rapidly, with, however,
comparatively little shelter from a long-range fire, while to climb
the wall {p.042} and cross the terrace, though a short process,
involved the utmost exposure. Concerning the last scene of the drama,
the scaling the nearly precipitous fronts which skirted the Boers'
position, the difficulty of the achievement caused the losses of the
assailants there to be heaviest. It may be added that, owing to the
unexpected and rapid developments of the day, most of the British
fought without breakfast or other food.

As soon as the enemy were discovered a company of infantry occupied
the donga, where successive reinforcements were received, and under
cover of which the line prepared for the assault. At 5.30 the Boers
surprised the British by opening with artillery--six guns--at an
estimated distance of 5,400 yards from the British camp. To this three
batteries replied, two of which were soon moved down to the town side
of the donga. The artillery duel, at a range of 2,000 to 3,000 yards,
continued until toward eight o'clock, when the Boers ceased firing,
and General Symons gave the order to prepare for the assault.
Difficult as was the task, and inferior though the assailants were in
number, the conditions were {p.043} such that the weak garrison of
Dundee had no prospect of ultimate escape, unless they could rout the
enemy with which they were engaged before the co-operating body from
the north arrived.

While the action was in its early stages, at 10 A.M., scouts reported
a large force approaching along the railroad. The small detachment
left to guard the British camp moved out to meet and, if possible, to
delay this new enemy. Besides the purely local conditions, it was
essential, in the genera