g over sea. So regarded, the vigour with
which the British took the initiative, assumed the offensive,
themselves in turn attacking in detail, and severely punishing, the
separate factors of the enemy's {p.057} combination, is worthy of
great praise. Sir Penn Symons is perhaps entitled to the greater meed
because to him fell, with the greater burden, the greater opportunity,
to which he proved not unequal.

Such men were worthy of the steady forward gallantry shown by officers
and men. Both leaders and led easily carry off the palm from the more
phlegmatic opponents, who failed to sweep them away. The result was to
save Ladysmith, or rather--what was most really important--to save the
organized force that was there shut in. The brilliant antecedent
campaign, the offensive right and left strokes, the prompt and timely
resolve of Yule to retreat just as he did, and the consequent
concentration, utterly frustrated the Boers' combinations, and
shattered antecedently their expectations of subduing the British by
the cheaper method of exhaustion. The failure was not only signal, but
in the end discreditable; for while success is no sure proof of merit,
nor its opposite of indesert, the wide miscalculation of the ultimate
result, which kept the Boers so long inactive before Ladysmith, and
saved Natal, while reinforcements were {p.058} well known all the
while to be hasting across the sea, is entitled to scant respect from
any indications in its favour. The faulty execution of the original
plan, which enabled the enemy to concentrate and to accumulate
adequate means of resistance, and the subsequent underestimate of the
endurance of the garrison, bear the same mark. In issuing their
ultimatum, in opening the campaign, in combining against Dundee, and
finally in investing Ladysmith, the Boers exceeded decisively that
five minutes of delay upon which, to use Nelson's words, turns victory
or defeat; and the loss of time, as yet only serious, through the
procrastinations of the siege became irremediable.

It is noticeable that the returns of casualties at Elandslaagte do not
perfectly bear out extreme conclusions as to the fatal preponderance
of the defence over the offence in modern warfare. As reported soon
after the action, the British lost in killed, 55; in wounded, 199. Of
the Boers, 65 dead were found on the ground; others, estimated--guessed
is perhaps more correct--at 50, were killed in pursuit by the cavalry.
Their wound