t the projection of the narrow neck of
Natal, forming an acute salient angle between two hostile borders,
gave especial facilities to the Boers to combine their movements
outside the observation of the enemy, and {p.037} to strike suddenly
either at one of the British detachments, or at the railroad uniting
them. Small bodies began to make their appearance from both quarters
almost immediately after the expiry of the time set by the ultimatum,
and for three or four days the ordinary reports of outpost
observations and shots exchanged were continually received.

The uncertainty consequent upon these divergent demonstrations, some
of which from the Free State seemed to aim at the rear of Ladysmith
itself, was balanced and checked by the knowledge that the principal
Transvaal force had assembled round Zandspruit, in its own territory,
near the railroad, and some fifteen miles beyond Majuba Hill. There
was reason also to believe that the Transvaalers would be found more
enterprising and numerous than the Free State men. It was, therefore,
natural to expect that the main attack would come from the north along
the railroad, and from the east, where the approach from the Transvaal
boundary, which is there marked by the Buffalo River, is over a
country much more practicable than the western mountain range. These
considerations in {p.038} fact appear to have dictated the first
combination of the Boers.

Within a week from the opening of hostilities, the latter had occupied
Newcastle, thirty-seven miles by rail from Glencoe. On the 18th
further demonstrations caused General Symons to withdraw the outpost
stationed at Glencoe to the camp, which was a mile and a half west of
Dundee. The following day, Thursday, he received information, which
proved to be in the main accurate, that a combined movement was in
progress by which his position was to be simultaneously attacked from
the north and from the east. The force in the latter direction was
given at 7,000--probably an excessive estimate; although, as several
commandos had been reported on Wednesday to be moving from the
northern toward the eastern column, it is probable that the latter was
expected to make the chief attack. A British reconnaissance on the
same evening had showed the enemy apparently in force some ten miles
to the northward on the railway; but, if an attack from that quarter
were intended, the Boer combination failed, for none was made.
General {p.039} Joubert, i