ughly committed,
that if England once started in with him she could not turn against
him. But he had evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon
III in Mexico. Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American
minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the
foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy accepted
this offer and withdrew their squadrons. Germany, however, remained
for a time obdurate. This much was known at the time.

A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been
made public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay." Into the
merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of the
Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. The
significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure,
is, however, amply established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the
entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in
Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. Why did Germany
back down from her position? Her navy was supposed to be at least as
powerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure
strength with the United States was that England had accepted
arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the
United States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicely
adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put
to the test of actual war.

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce. The failure to
cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but
to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and
consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial
development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that
our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both
North and So