from him in case of trouble. In fact, John Hay wrote from
London at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at our
disposal for the asking.

Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was so
marked that some writers have naively concluded that a secret treaty of
alliance between the two countries was made in 1897. The absurdity of
such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago.
England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For a
hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued the
policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With the
rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth
century, England realized that she could no longer pursue this policy.
Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted extensive naval programs
when we went to war with Spain. Our acquisition of the Philippines and
Porto Rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made a
large American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore,
that she would have to cast about for future allies. She therefore
signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a defensive
alliance with Japan in 1902.

In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the
long-deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further
insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would lead to
friction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to
recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to
give us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal at
whatever point we might choose to build it. While the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of
much wider significance. It amounted, in fact, to the recognition of
American naval supremacy in the West Indies, and since its signature
Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic
area. The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is now
firmly established and in fact unquestioned. The American public did
not appreciate at the time the true significance of the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty, and a few years later Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Act
a clause exempting American ships engaged in the coast-wise trade from
the payment of tolls. Great Britain at once protested against the
exemption clause as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote T