our military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at the
earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final
adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of
China, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . ."

Again, November 21, 1900:

"What a business this has been in China! So far we have got on by
being honest and naif. . . . At least we are spared the infamy of an
alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China,
than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take
anything nowadays from a German? Buelow said yesterday in
substance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. If
we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and
not a man in the world kicks."

During the long negotiations that followed the occupation of Peking by
the powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the
side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on
China and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong,
independent, responsible Chinese government. Contrary to the terms of
the final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troops
concentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exacting
further concessions from China. The open-door policy was again
ignored. The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan to
sign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England's
interest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that if
either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other
party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which
event the second party would come to the assistance of the first. A
formal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some of
the demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that the
American government had an understanding with England and Japan, but
Mr. Hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about the
Anglo-Japanese agreement until it was made public. He succeeded in
securing from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate
Manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near,
Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberately
misrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals.

After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extend
the scop