or--would indulge in a domination which would be almost unbearable
to every other nation. Particularly would this be the case in respect to
her relations with the United States, a nation with which she always has
had and always must have intimate trade and commercial relations.

Should Germany make England impotent and France powerless we should
become more or less dependent upon German good-will, and it is highly
probable, indeed I regard it as a certainty, that before long, in such
an event, the Monroe Doctrine would cease to exercise any important
influence on world events. It would become a thing of the past--a "scrap
of paper."

You see that while I am not neutral to the extreme, while I fervently
hope and pray that Germany may not be wrecked and that she may emerge
from the war with full ability to maintain her own, I cannot believe
that it would be good for her or good for the world in general if she
found herself absolutely and incontrovertibly victorious at the end of
the great struggle. In other words, I wish Germany to be victorious, but
I do not wish her to be too victorious.

This brings us definitely to the question as to what can be done to stop
this war. Its continuance is infinitely costly of men and treasure; its
prosecution to the bitter end would mean complete disaster for one
contestant and only less complete destruction for the other, and it
would give to the victor, no matter what his sufferings and losses might
have been, a power dangerous to the entire world.

How shall it end? We do not want its end to mean a new European map.
Anything of the sort would include the seed of another European war, to
be fought out later and at even greater probable cost, with all the
world-disturbance implied in such an eventuation.

What the United States should desire and does desire is an understanding
between these nations, of just what they are fighting for, which I
almost believe they no longer know themselves, and a conference between
them now, a pause to think, which at least may help toward stimulating
each side to make concessions, before the ultimate of damage has been
done.

Such a conference might be called even without any interval in warfare
and induced without definite outside intervention from ourselves or any
one else. I believe it not to be beyond the bounds of possibility that
if this course could be brought about importantly enough, a way out of
this brutal struggle and carnage might be