stro-Hungarian Government felt
compelled to take extreme measures by means of which to safeguard the
integrity of the empire.

The firm but fatal ultimatum to Servia followed, the reply to which,
suffice it to say, was unsatisfactory to Austria, who could not accept
the suggestion of an investigation into the circumstances attending the
assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand through a commission or court on
which she was not represented.

Like Maine Case.

The situation really was analogous to that which existed between the
United States and Spain when the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor. In
order to fix the responsibility for this dastardly affair we then
similarly demanded an investigation by Spain, to be carried out with the
assistance of representatives of this Government. Spain, too, then
offered to conduct an investigation, but she peremptorily declined to
allow us to take part in it.

This attitude on her part quickly brought about our declaration of war
against her. It is important that Americans should realize the
similarity in the two situations and the likeness of the Austrian action
of 1914 to that which our own Government took in 1898.

As soon as Austria had rejected as unsatisfactory Servia's reply to her
ultimatum she prepared to undertake a punitive armed expedition against
Servia, and Russia at once declared that she would rank herself as
Servia's protector.

Indeed, without any further parley, and to give effect to this threat,
Russia immediately mobilized her army. Since then it has been averred
that this mobilization had been in progress for several weeks previous
to Servia's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum.

This made it obligatory upon Germany to go to Austria's aid, under the
provisions of their treaty of alliance, although she was well aware that
such an action would bring France into the conflict under the terms of
her alliance with Russia. Indeed, an unsatisfactory reply had been
received from France as to the latter's intentions, but Germany
endeavored to secure at least an assurance of England's neutrality. This
proved to be impossible.

How the German Government could indulge for a moment in the hope that in
a war with Russia and France on the one side and Germany and Austria on
the other, England could be induced to remain neutral passes
comprehension, but that it did believe this seems a certainty.

The English Government, no doubt, correctly felt that without the ai