premise, the Admiralty had him
technically at their mercy; but such a triumph as they could win by
disciplining him would be more disastrous than a defeat. He disclaimed
resentment towards any person, and reiterated that his action was
intended merely to defend his character and honor, which he said--to
quote the minute exactly--"were not _so much_ touched as he apprehended
when the suspicion he had of Mr. Howe's going to Basque Roads
arose--from the Lords asking him some days since for a draft of the
Roads." The italics are the present writer's; but the words as they
stand would indicate that he did not yield his view of the matter in
general, nor leave hearers under any doubt as to how far he could safely
be treated with contumely or slight. There can be little doubt that the
substantial result was to strengthen his position in the exacting duty
that lay before him in the following year.

The whole business was then salved over by the First Lord, Anson, taking
command of the Channel Fleet for the particular occasion. Hawke
accompanied him as second in command, while Howe went his way with the
light squadron and the troops. Both divisions sailed on the 1st of June.
On the 18th our admiral was so unwell with a severe fever and cold--a
complaint to which he was much subject--that he had to ask to be sent
into port. He went ashore before the end of the month, and remained
unemployed till the following May.

The year 1759 is the culminating epoch of Hawke's career. In it occurred
the signal triumph of Quiberon Bay, the seal of his genius, significant
above all as demonstrating that the ardor of the leader had found
fulfilment in his followers, that the spirit of Hawke had become the
spirit of the Navy. This year also yielded proof of his great capacity
as a seaman and administrator, in the efficient blocking of Brest,
prolonged through six months of closest watching into the period of the
winter gales, in face of which it had hitherto been thought impossible
to keep the sea with heavy ships massed in fleets; for, as he most
justly said, in explaining the necessity of maintaining the rendezvous
fixed by him, "A single ship may struggle with a hard gale of wind when
a squadron cannot. In working against a strong westerly gale in the
Channel, where it cannot make very long stretches,"--because it finds
shores and shoals on either side,--"it must always by wearing lose
ground, but more especially if it should so blow as to p