e felt himself
right.

From this time forward Hawke's service was confined to the Channel
Fleet. This was, during that war, the post for the most capable of
British officers; for, while the matter at stake was over-sea
predominance and conquest, yet both these depended upon the
communications of the French colonies and distant possessions with the
mother country. The source of all their strength, the one base
indispensable to their operations, was the coast of France; to close
exit from this was therefore to strike at the root. This was much less
true for the colonies of Great Britain, at least in America; their
numbers, and resources in every way, were so far superior to those of
Canada that they needed only to be preserved from interference by the
navy of France,--an end also furthered by the close watch of the French
ports. This blockade, as it is often, but erroneously, styled, Hawke was
the first to maintain thoroughly and into the winter months; and in so
doing he gave an extension to the practice of naval warfare, which
amounted to a veritable revolution in naval strategy. The conception was
one possible only to a thorough seaman, who knew exactly and practically
what ships could do; one also in whom professional knowledge received
the moral support of strong natural self-confidence,--power to initiate
changes, to assume novel responsibility, through the inner assurance of
full adequacy to bear it.

All this Hawke had. The method, therefore, the holding the sea, and the
exposure of heavy ships to weather before thought impossible, was well
within the range of his ability,--of his native and acquired faculties;
but it is due to him to recognize the intellectual force, the
originality, which lifted him above the accepted tradition of his
predecessors, and by example transmitted to the future a system of
warfare that then, as well as in his own hands, was to exercise a
decisive effect upon the course of history. It is also to be remembered
that he took this weighty step with instruments relatively imperfect,
and greatly so. The bottoms of ships were not yet coppered; in
consequence they fouled very rapidly, the result of which was loss of
speed. This meant that much greater power, press of canvas, was needed
to force them through the water, and that they had to be sent frequently
into port to be cleaned. Thus they were less able than ships of later
days to overtake an enemy, or to keep off a lee shore, while more