rance of their
communications. The general might have his own opinion as to the power
of the navy to carry out the proposed passage of the forts, and as to
whether its coal, when once above, would outlast the endurance of the
hostile garrisons; but those were points upon which the Navy Department,
which undertook the risk, might be presumed to have more accurate
judgment than himself.
The conference, which was held about the middle of November, 1861,
resulted in the adoption of Mr. Fox's plan in its main outlines; but
with an important addition, which threatened at one time to become a
very serious modification. Commander Porter suggested that the naval
vessels should be accompanied by a mortar flotilla, to subdue the fire
of the forts by bombardment, and so to allow the fleet to pass without
risk, or with risk much diminished. This proposition approved itself to
the engineer instincts of McClellan, and was adopted. The general then
designated Major Barnard, of the Engineer Corps, to represent him in
adjusting the details of the expedition. Barnard also took strong ground
in favor of the mortars, and to this added the opinion--in which Porter
concurred--that the forts should be not merely bombarded, but reduced
before the passage. He summed up his conclusions in the following
perfectly clear words: "To pass those works (merely) with a fleet and
appear before New Orleans is merely a raid--no capture. New Orleans and
the river can not be held until communications are perfectly
established." The assertion of the last sentence can not be denied; it
admits of no difference of opinion. The point in dispute between the two
arguments was not this, but whether the fall of the city, which had no
local defenses, would entail that of the forts, and so open the
communications. Mr. Fox strongly held that it would; but although he
stuck to his opinion, he had a deservedly high estimate of Porter's
professional ability--so much so that, had the latter's rank justified,
he would have urged him for the command of the expedition. In this
doubtful state of the argument, it will be seen of how great importance
was the choice of the officer to be put in charge of the whole
undertaking. Had he also taken the view of Barnard and Porter in favor
of the more cautious, but--as it proved--more dangerous course, it could
scarcely have failed that Fox would have been overruled.
The nomination of this officer could not be longer deferred. Secrecy
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