having heard all the opinions expressed by the
different commanders, is of the opinion that whatever is to be
done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced
to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the
bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses
and material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the
same opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter--that is,
there are three modes of attack,[O] and the question is, which is
the one to be adopted? His own opinion is that a combination of
two should be made, viz., _the forts should be run, and when a
force is once above the forts to protect the troops they should
be landed at Quarantine from the Gulf side by bringing them
through the bayou_, and then our forces should move up the
river, mutually aiding each other as it can be done to advantage.

"When in the opinion of the flag-officer the propitious time has
arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the
conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the
respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet we
have the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, No.
8, and abide the result--conquer or be conquered--drop anchor or
keep under way, as in his opinion is best.

"_Unless the signal above mentioned is made_, it will be
understood that the first order of sailing will be formed after
leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river _in
accordance with the original opinion expressed_.

"The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general
order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for
the service as indicated.

D. G. FARRAGUT,
_Flag-officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron_".

[Footnote O: Those three were: First, a direct naval attack upon
the works; second, running by the works; third, a combined attack
by army and navy.]

Nothing can be clearer than that the opinion expressed and maintained by
the flag-officer from the beginning was the one carried out, resulting
in a complete success.

The bombardment by the mortar flotilla was continued three days longer,
at the end of which time the provision of bombs immediately obtainable
was becoming exhausted. Enough, however, remained to sustain a very
vigorous fire during the period of the passage, and as