y discerned in
the dark; while the decks were whitewashed, so as to throw in stronger
relief articles lying upon them which needed to be quickly seen.

Having given his general instructions, the flag officer could intrust
the details of preparation to his subordinates; but no one could relieve
him of the momentous decision upon which the issues of the campaign must
turn. The responsibility of rejecting one course of action and adopting
another was his alone; and as has already been remarked, the wording of
the department's order, literally understood, imposed upon him the task
of reducing the forts before approaching the city. The questions
involved were essentially the same as those presented to every general
officer when the course of a campaign has brought him face to face with
a strong position of the enemy. Shall it be carried by direct attack,
and, until so subdued, arrest the progress of the army? or can it be
rendered impotent or untenable by severing its communications and by
operations directed against the district in its rear, which it protects,
and upon which it also depends? The direct attack may be by assault, by
investment, or by regular siege approaches; but whatever the method, the
result is the same--the assailant is detained for a longer or shorter
time before the position. During such detention the post fulfills its
mission of securing the region it covers, and permits there the
uninterrupted prosecution of the military efforts of every character
which are designed to impede the progress of the invader.

To such cases no general rule applies; each turns upon particular
conditions, and, although close similarities may exist between various
instances, probably no two are entirely identical. It is evident,
however, that very much will depend upon the offensive power shut up in
the position under consideration. If it be great walled town, such as
are found on the Continent of Europe, behind whose defenses are
sheltered numerous troops, the assailant who advances beyond it thereby
exposes his communications to attack; and, to guard against this danger,
must protect them by a force adequate to hold the garrison in check. If,
again, there be but a single line by which the communications can be
maintained, by which supplies and re-enforcements can go forward, and
that line passes close under the work and is commanded by it, the
garrison may be small, incapable of external action, and yet may vitally
affect