the defenses of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip,
and by his appearance before New Orleans. For, after all, the forts were
never captured by actual attack.... This brilliant result is a striking
instance of the due appreciation by a commander of the effect which
daring achievements exert on men's minds, although, _as in this case_,
those daring acts _do not actually, directly, or materially_ make
certain the end or surrender they may have secured." And, again, in
another place: "Admiral Farragut's success was mainly due to the moral
effect produced by his gallant passage of the forts.... He never reduced
the forts, and seems to have done them but little harm."[K]

[Footnote K: Lord Wolseley in _North American Review_, vol. cxlix,
pp. 32-34, 597. The italics are the author's.]

The moral effect produced in war upon men's minds, and through the mind
upon their actions, is undeniable, and may rightly count for much in the
calculations of a commander; but when it becomes the sole, or even the
chief reliance, as in Bonaparte's advance into Carinthia in 1797, the
spirit displayed approaches closely to that of the gambler who counts
upon a successful bluff to disconcert his opponent. The serious
objection to relying upon moral effect alone to overcome resistance is
that moral forces do not admit of as close knowledge and measurement as
do material conditions. The insight and moral strength of the enemy may
be greater than you have means of knowing, and to assume that they are
less is to fall into the dangerous error of despising your enemy. To
attribute to so dubious a hope, alone, the daring act of Admiral
Farragut in passing the forts and encountering the imperfectly known
dangers above, is really to detract from his fame as a capable as well
as gallant leader. That there were risks and accidents to be met he knew
full well; that he might incur disaster he realized; that the dangers
above and the power of the enemy's vessels might exceed his expectations
was possible; war can not be stripped of hazard, and the anxiety of the
doubtful issue is the penalty the chieftain pays for his position. But
Farragut was convinced by experience and reflection that his fleet could
force its passage; and he saw that once above the material probabilities
were that army and navy could be combined in such a position of vantage
as would isolate the forts from all relief, and so "actually, directly,
and materially make certain their surrend