, that three
steamers should go up the river shortly after dark, under my own
guidance, to break the boom."
It appears from this account, supported by the general order issued
immediately after it and given a few pages further on, that Farragut had
definitely determined not to await the reduction of the forts, because
the bombardment so far did not indicate any probability of effectual
results. It was his deliberate opinion that the loss of time and the
waste of effort were entailing greater risks than would be caused by
cutting adrift from his base and severing his own communications in
order to strike at those of the enemy. It is commonly true that in the
effort to cut the communications of an opponent one runs the risk of
exposing his own; but in this case the attacking force was one
pre-eminently qualified to control the one great medium of communication
throughout that region--that is, the water. Also, although in
surrendering the river Farragut gave up the great line of travel, he
kept in view that the bayou system offered an alternative, doubtless
greatly inferior, but which, nevertheless, would serve to plant above
the forts, under the protection of the navy, such troops as should be
deemed necessary; and that the combined efforts of army and navy could
then maintain a sufficient flow of supplies until the forts fell from
isolation. Finally, a fleet is not so much an army as a collection of
floating fortresses, garrisoned, provisioned, and mobile. It carries its
communications in its hulls, and is not in such daily dependence upon
external sources as is the sister service.
In deciding, therefore, against awaiting the reduction of the forts by
direct attack, and in favor of attempting the same result by striking at
the interests they defended and the base on which they rested, Farragut
was guided by a calculation of the comparative _material_ risks and
advantages of the two courses, and not mainly by consideration of the
moral effect produced upon the defenders by a successful stroke, as has
been surmised by Lord Wolseley. This eminent English authority
attributes the success of the expedition against New Orleans to three
causes. "First, the inadequate previous preparation of the naval part
of the New Orleans defenses; second, the want of harmonious working
between the Confederate naval and military forces; and, lastly,
Farragut's clear appreciation of the moral effect he would produce by
forcing his way past
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