r line of the two
sections, the steps of the Navy Department were taken so quietly, and
followed so closely upon the resolve to act, that the alarm was not
quickly taken; and when intimations of attack from the sea did filter
through, they had to encounter and dislodge strong contrary
preoccupations in the minds of the Southern leaders. Only the
Confederate general commanding the military division and his principal
subordinates seem to have been alive to the danger of New Orleans, and
their remonstrances had no effect. Not only were additional guns denied
them and sent North, but drafts were made on their narrow resources to
supply points considered to be in greater danger. A striking indication
of the prepossessions which controlled the authorities at Richmond was
elicited by Commodore Hollins, of the Confederate Navy. That gallant
veteran was ordered to take to Memphis several of the rams extemporized
at New Orleans. He entreated the Navy Department to allow him to remain,
but the reply was that the main attack upon New Orleans would be from
above, not from below. After the fleet entered the river he telegraphed
from Memphis for permission to return, but received the answer that the
proposition was wholly inadmissible. Before the Court of Inquiry upon
the loss of New Orleans, he testified that the withdrawal of his ships
was the chief cause of the disaster.[H]

[Footnote H: _Official Records of the War of the Rebellion_,
Series I, vol. vi, p. 610.]

While the heavy ships were being dragged over the bar at the Southwest
Pass, the mortar flotilla had entered the river under the command of
Commander Porter. No time was avoidably lost, though there were
inevitable delays due to the magnitude of the preparations that in every
quarter taxed the energies of the Government. On the 16th of April, less
than ten days after the Pensacola got safely inside, the fleet was
anchored just out of range of the forts. On the 18th the mortar vessels
were in position, and at 10 A. M. the bombardment by them began,
continuing throughout the succeeding days till the passage of the fleet,
and being chiefly directed upon Fort Jackson. From daylight to dark a
shell a minute was fired, and as the practice was remarkably good a
great proportion of these fell within the fort. As Farragut had
predicted, they did not in the course of six days' bombardment do harm
enough to compel a surrender or disable the work; but they undoubtedly
harassed t