ake, he called to see me about it. I was seated on the piazza,
engaged in conversation with my staff, when he came up. After a
few moments' conversation, he said he would like to see me alone.
We passed into the house together and shut the door after us.
Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying
that I was putting myself voluntarily in a position which an enemy
would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. I
was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me,
and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below.
He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of
troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of
supplies which they would guard as the apple of the eye, etc. He
pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the
campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true
campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high
ground could be reached on the east bank of the river, fortify
there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there,
being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I
said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that
was the very place he should go to, and would move by railroad
from Memphis to Granada. To this I replied, the country is already
disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our
armies,... and if we went back so far as Memphis, it would
discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of
no use; neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would
be furnished. The problem was to move forward to a decisive
victory, or our cause was lost.... Sherman wrote to my
adjutant-general embodying his views of the campaign that should
be made, and asking him to advise me at least to get the views of
my generals upon the subject. Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
did not see any reasons for changing my plans."--_Personal Memoirs
of U. S. Grant_, vol. i, p. 542 (note).]

The reasons in favor of waiting for the fall of the works were ably
presented by Commander Porter in a paper which he asked to have read in
a council of commanding officers of the fleet, assembled on board the
flag-ship on the third day of the bombardment, April 20. Farragut was
already familiar with the arguments on both sides, and Porter's paper
can be regarded only as an