ignore their value, "and never," wrote
Farragut in his report, "was the utility of these vessels so apparent.
Everything was done by them. The day was calm, or nearly so, and the
ships had no sails to manage. As soon as the anchor was let go they were
ready for action. The bomb-vessels were next placed (for which the range
had been calculated), and two sloops took position at right angles with
the range, to tell by signal the effect of the bombs. So you see all was
arranged with science and skill and without the slightest interruption,
for the Mexicans had given an order to the commander of the fort not on
any account to fire the first gun." This order was, in Farragut's
opinion, the principal cause of the French sustaining so little loss. A
well directed fire from the fort would, he thought, have destroyed the
steamers and prevented the frigates from gaining the carefully chosen
position, where they were least exposed to the guns of the works.

Immediately after the submission of the castle Farragut went ashore to
examine and note the effects of the fire, and especially of the
horizontal shell fire; which was then so much a novelty in naval warfare
that he speaks of the missiles continuously as shell-shot, apparently to
distinguish them from the vertically thrown bombs. "Now it was seen for
the first time that the material of which Ulloa is built (soft coral)
was the worst substance in the world for protection against the modern
shell. The French threw almost entirely shell-shot, which entered the
wall twelve or eighteen inches and then exploded, tearing out great
masses of stone, and in some instances rending the wall from base to
top. The damage done by these shell-shot was inconceivably greater than
that by the shell from the bomb-vessels, owing to the former striking
horizontally, while the latter fell vertically upon the bomb-proofs,
doing but little damage.... I am satisfied of one fact--viz., that they
might have bombarded with the bomb-vessels for a month without success,
while the frigates would in four hours more, with their shell-shot, have
reduced the fort to a heap of ruins." This opinion as to the inefficacy
of bomb-firing to destroy a work anticipated the experience of the Civil
War, where the conclusion was that it might wear out the endurance of
the garrison by constant harassment, but not directly reduce the works
themselves. It is only just to say that his estimate of the effect of
the horizontal fire