to the Antwerp business, it certainly did seem to me that our
principal commander on the Western Front (for the moment there were
two) was not being very well treated. From a perusal of some of the
communications that were flying about at a juncture when Sir J. French
was confronted by a complex problem, and was virtually embarking on an
entirely new set of operations, one gathered that he was hardly being
kept so well informed of what was in progress and of what was
contemplated as he had a right to expect, and as was indeed demanded
by the situation. Still, this was no doubt due to what one might call
bad Staff work, and not to any wish to keep Sir John in the dark as to
Sir H. Rawlinson's orders, nor as to the position of this new British
force that was being planted down in the war zone. It may well have
been the direct result of Lord K.'s system of keeping all telegraphic
work in connection with operations in his own hands, instead of this
being carried out by the General Staff as under the existing
regulations it was supposed to be.

Much has been written and has been said in public about the pushing of
the General Staff into the background at the War Office during the
early months of the war. An idea exists that this subversion was
mainly, if not indeed entirely, consequential on the weakening of its
personnel as a body owing to a number of its most prominent and
experienced members having gone off to the wars. While readily
admitting that its efficiency suffered as a result of these
withdrawals, I am by no means sure that it would have managed to keep
in the foreground even if the whole of its more shining lights had on
mobilization remained where they were in Whitehall. Lord Kitchener had
never been closely associated with Generals Robertson and Henry
Wilson, its two principal members to leave for the front, and it by no
means follows that if they had remained they would, during the first
few critical weeks, have been much more successful than were Sir C.
Douglas and Sir J. Wolfe-Murray in keeping a hand on the helm. The
Secretary of State would no doubt have learnt to value their counsel
before long, but he would no more have tolerated the slightest attempt
at dictation in respect to the general conduct of the war until he
knew his men, than he would have put up with dictation as to how the
personnel which he was attracting into the ranks at the rate of tens
of thousands per week were to be disposed of. The st