l be made in a later
chapter. The consequence was that for several days I heard no more
about Sir Ian's operations beyond what appeared in the newspapers, and
it was only when Mr. Churchill turned up somewhat unexpectedly and
told me what had occurred, that it was borne in on me that our
Dardanelles expeditionary force was completely held up in cramped
positions and without elbow-room on an uncomfortable sort of shore. An
examination of the telegrams and a discussion with my assistants after
getting back from Paris convinced me that the situation was in the
highest degree unsatisfactory, and I gathered, furthermore, that H.M.
Government did not seem to be aware how unsatisfactory the situation
was.

A day or two later, Lord K. summoned me to his room to ask some
question, when I found Sir E. Grey closeted with him. Here was an
opportunity that was not to be missed. While the Chief was making a
note at his desk of the point that he wanted to know, I spoke to Sir
Edward, and told him in effect that we had not a dog's chance of
getting through the Dardanelles unless he secured the aid of the
Bulgars, or of the Greeks, or of both of them--purposely putting the
matter more strongly than I actually felt about it, in the hopes of
making an impression by a jeremiad. Lord K. stopped writing and looked
up. We had a short conversation, and after a few minutes I left the
room. The Foreign Minister may not have been impressed, but Lord K.
was; for he sent for me again later in the day, and we had a long
discussion about Sir I. Hamilton's prospects. The incident, moreover,
had a result which I had not anticipated. From that time forward the
Chief often talked to me about the position in the Dardanelles and in
the Near East generally. He used to take me with him to the
Dardanelles Committee which was formed soon afterwards; and when he
was away I ordinarily represented him at the deliberations of that
body, deliberations which, as a matter of fact, covered a good deal of
ground besides the Gallipoli Peninsula.

It struck me at the time that Lord Kitchener's confidence in himself
and his own judgement, in connection with what may be called
operations subjects, had been somewhat shaken, and that from this
stage onwards he rather welcomed the opinion of others when such
points arose. The Antwerp adventure had proved a fiasco. The endeavour
to force the Dardanelles by naval power, unaided by troops, had
conspicuously failed. Coming on