g
round a table with no Cabinet Ministers present, I am certain that
the report that we should have drawn up would have been dead against
the whole thing. The objections raised from the military side would
have been quite sufficient to dispel any doubts that the sailors had
left on the subject. As for that naive theory that we might draw back
in the middle of the naval operations supposing that the business went
awry, of which I do not remember hearing at the time---- Pooh! We
could hardly, left to ourselves, have been such flats as to take that
seriously.

The cable message from Tenedos which announced the result of the first
effort against the conspicuous and comparatively feeble works that
defended the mouth of the Straits, was the reverse of heartening. The
bombarding squadron enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in armament
from every point of view--range, weight of metal, and accuracy. The
conditions were almost ideal for the attacking side, as there was
plenty of sea-room and no worry about mines. If the warships could not
finally dispose of Turkish works such as this, and with everything
favourable, by long-range fire, then long-range fire was "off." Once
inside the Straits, the fleet, manoeuvring without elbow-room, would
have to get pretty near its work, mines or no mines, if it was going
to do any good. The idea of the _Queen Elizabeth_ pitching her stuff
over the top of the Gallipoli Peninsula left one cold. Several days
before Admiral de Robeck delivered his determined attack upon the
defences of the Narrows of the 18th of March, one had pretty well made
up one's mind that the thing was going to be a failure, and that the
army was going to be let in for an extremely uncomfortable business.

Accounts emanating from the Turkish side have suggested that the naval
operations were within an ace of succeeding, and that they only had to
be pressed a little further to achieve their object. An examination of
the books by Mr. Morgenthau and others does not bear this out. The
Turks imagined that our fleet had been beaten off by gun-fire on the
18th, and they appear to have got nervous because the ammunition for
certain of their heaviest guns was running short. Their heavy guns,
and the ammunition for them, was a matter of quite secondary
importance. The fleet was beaten off owing to the effect of the
drifting mines. The Turks thought that the damage done to the ships
was due to their batteries, when it was in reality