ation the extreme jealousy with
which the Turks, quite properly from their point of view, had always
regarded the appearance of strangers in that well-watched region, the
information contained in the secret official publications which the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force took out with it was by no means to
be despised. All but one of the landing places actually utilized on
the famous 25th of April were, I think, designated in these booklets,
and that one was unsuitable for landing anything but infantry. A great
deal of the information proved to be perfectly correct, and a good
deal more of it might have proved to be correct had the Expeditionary
Force ever penetrated far enough into the interior of the Peninsula to
test it.
There had been many occasions giving grounds for disquietude since the
days of Mons, but I never felt greater anxiety at any time during the
war than when awaiting tidings as to the landing on the Aegean shore.
We knew that this was about to take place, but I was not aware of the
details of Sir I. Hamilton's plan. Soldiers who had examined carefully
into the factors likely to govern a disembarkation in force in face of
an enemy who was fully prepared, were unanimous in viewing such an
operation as a somewhat desperate enterprise. There was no modern
precedent for an undertaking of the kind. One dreaded some grave
disaster, feared that the troops might entirely fail to gain a footing
on shore, and pictured them as driven off after suffering overwhelming
losses. The message announcing that a large part of the army was
safely disembarked came as an immense relief. Although disappointed at
learning that only a portion of the troops had been put ashore at
Anzac on the outside of the Peninsula, which, I had presumed, would be
the point selected for the main attack, I felt decidedly optimistic
for the moment. What had appeared to be the greatest obstacle to
success had been overcome, for a landing had been effected in spite of
all that the enemy could do to hinder it. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, I left London immediately afterwards, and it was a bitter
disappointment to hear the truth a few days later, to realize that my
first appreciation had been incorrect, and to learn that gaining a
footing on shore did not connote an immediate advance into the
interior. It provides a good example of how difficult it is to
forecast results in war.
By fairly early in May, there already seemed to be little
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