s under consideration of those responsible. Well
did Mr. Lloyd George say in the House of Commons many months later in
the course of his first speech after becoming Prime Minister: "You
cannot run a war with a Sanhedrin."

When the War Council, or the Cabinet, or whatever set of men in
authority it was who at last got something settled, made up their
minds that a withdrawal of sorts was really to take place, they in a
measure reversed the decision which I had been charged to convey to
the French Government a fortnight before. The orders sent out to Sir
C. Monro only directed an evacuation of Anzac and Suvla to take place.
This, it may be observed, seems to some extent to have been the fault
of the sailor-men. They butted in, wanting to hang on to Helles on
watching-the-Straits grounds; they were apparently ready to impose
upon our naval forces in the Aegean the very grave responsibility of
mothering a small army, which was blockaded and dominated on the land
side, as it clung to the inhospitable, storm-driven toe of the
Gallipoli Peninsula in midwinter.

Sir W. Robertson arrived a few days later to take up the appointment
of C.I.G.S., which, I knew, meant the splitting up of my Directorate.
Being aware of his views beforehand as we had often talked it over, I
had a paper ready drafted for his approval urging an immediate total
evacuation of Turkish soil in this region. This he at once submitted
to the War Council, and within two or three days orders were
telegraphed out to the Aegean to the effect that Helles was to be
abandoned. After remaining a few days longer at the War Office as
Director of Military Intelligence, I was sent by the C.I.G.S. on a
special mission to Russia, and my direct connection with the General
Staff came to an end but for a short period in the summer of 1917. It
is a satisfaction to remember that the last question of importance in
which I was concerned before leaving Whitehall for the East was in
lending a hand towards getting our troops out of the impossible
position they were in at the mouth of the Dardanelles.

CHAPTER VI

SOME EXPERIENCES IN THE WAR OFFICE

A reversion to earlier dates -- The statisticians in the winter
of 1914-15 -- The efforts to prove that German man-power would
shortly give out -- Lack of the necessary premises upon which to
found such calculations -- Views on the maritime blockade -- The
projects for operations against the Belgian coa