prospect of
the Expeditionary Force achieving its object unless very strong
reinforcements in men and munitions were sent out to the Aegean. But
there was shortage of both men and munitions, and men and munitions
alike were needed elsewhere. The second Battle of Ypres, coupled with
the miscarriage of the Franco-British offensive about La Bassee,
indicated that the enemy was formidable on the Western Front.
Although there was every prospect of an improvement before long in
respect to munitions output, the shell shortage was at the moment
almost at its worst. We knew at the War Office that the Russians were
in grave straits in respect to weapons and ammunition, and one could
not tell whether the German Great General Staff, probably quite as
well aware of this as we were, would assume the offensive in the
Eastern theatre of war, or would transfer great bodies of troops from
East to West to make some determined effort against the French and
ourselves. The change of Government which introduced Mr. Asquith's
Coalition Cabinet, moreover, came about at this time, and political
palaver seriously delayed decisions.
It was, no doubt, unfortunate, from the point of view of the
Dardanelles campaign, that there was so much hesitation about sending
out the very substantial reinforcements which only actually reached
Sir I. Hamilton at the end of July and during the early days of
August. But it by no means necessarily follows that if they had
reached their destination, say, six weeks sooner, the Straits would
have been won. Much stress has always been laid upon the torpor that
descended upon Suvla during the very critical hours which followed the
successful disembarkation of the new force in that region; but those
inexperienced troops and their leaders must have acted with
extraordinary resolution and energy to have appreciably changed the
fortunes of General Birdwood's great offensive against Sari Bair.
Information from the Turkish side does not suggest that Liman von
Sanders gained any great accessions of strength during July and early
August. It was the ample warning which the enemy received of what was
impending before ever a soldier was landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula
that, far more than anything which occurred subsequently, rendered the
Dardanelles operations abortive.
The Dardanelles Committee came into being in June. This body included
most of the more prominent figures in the Coalition Cabinet.
Attending its deliberation
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