French -- His skilful handling of a Portuguese mission -- His
readiness to see foreign officers when asked to do so -- How he
handled them -- The Serbian Military Attache asks for approval of
an attack by his country upon Bulgaria at the time of Bulgarian
mobilization -- A dramatic interview with Lord K. -- Confidence
placed in him with regard to munitions by the Russians -- His
speeches in the House of Lords -- The heat of his room -- His
preoccupation about the safety of Egypt -- He disapproves of the
General Staff plan with regard to its defence -- His attitude
with regard to national service -- His difficulties in this
matter -- His anxiety to have a reserve in hand for delivering
the decisive blow in the war -- My last meeting with him -- His
pleasure in going to Russia -- His failure to accomplish his
mission, a great disaster to the Entente cause -- A final word
about him -- He did more than any man on the side of the Allies
to win the war -- Fitz.

Lord Kitchener's actions and attitude in connection with two
particular matters evoked a good deal of criticism in various quarters
at the time, and much has been said and written about them. One of
those matters was the munitions question, the other was the
Dardanelles undertaking; both of those subjects are, however,
discussed in special later chapters, and no reference will therefore
be made to them in this one, except incidentally. I have, moreover, no
recollection of ever having been brought into contact with the
Secretary of State in connection with those projects for combined
naval and military operations on the Flanders coast which received
considerable attention in the winter of 1914-15, although, as will be
mentioned in Chapter VI., aware of what was under review.

That Flanders coast scheme constituted, it may be observed, a question
of the general strategical conduct of the war; it was, in fact, a
question of "operations." The first time that I went into any problem
coming properly under that heading with the Secretary of State was
when a plan of landing troops at or near Alexandretta was on the tapis
in December 1914. There was a good deal to be said for such an
enterprise at that particular juncture. Military opinion invariably
favours active in preference to passive defence, so long as active
defence can be regarded as reasonably feasible and the troops needed
for the purpo