ch
freedom of movement on the part of these same States, which in two
successive wars had proved their ability to safeguard and promote
their vital interests in spite of all European opposition. To explain
this course of European diplomacy one must bear in mind that the
Balkan States, since their constitution as such, have always been
considered as proteges of Europe, or, to put it more plainly, as not
being of age, and therefore deprived of the right and privilege to
deal directly with their ancient master, Turkey, in all serious
matters in which their most vital interests were involved.

In the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 a
congress, in which all of the Great European powers participated, most
emphatically affirmed that Turkey was responsible to Europe for any
complaints that the Balkan States might have against the Ottoman
Government regarding the treatment of their connationals, still left
under the Sultan. At the same time the Balkan States received due
warning regarding their dealings with Turkey, and were made to take a
pledge that whenever they had troubles with the Porte the powers and
not themselves were to be the arbiters. All the world knows how
Turkey, by constant wire-pulling, secured immunity from Europe for not
fulfilling the obligations incumbent on her by the Treaty of Berlin,
and how one of the Balkan States, namely, Greece, was left alone and
unprotected, to be chastised by Turkey in 1897 for not leaving to the
powers the settlement of the Cretan question which had brought about
the war.

The European powers, having done practically nothing during
thirty-five years for the betterment of the conditions under which the
non-Moslem populations had to live in Turkey, were overwhelmed to hear
in the Autumn of 1912 the news of a series of alliances concluded at
Sofia on June 12 between Bulgaria and Servia, and between Bulgaria and
Greece, for the purpose of settling once for all the perennial Balkan
question. European diplomacy was slow, as usual, in grasping the
meaning of the new alliance, and when, on Oct. 5, 1912, Montenegro
suddenly declared war on Turkey, with Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece
following suit on the 18th, there was consternation in London, Paris,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and, to a certain degree, in Petrograd.

An idea of the unpreparedness of European diplomacy in the face of the
sudden Balkan war can be had by simply glancing at the records of the
British House o