d by Prince
Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the
English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey
whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality
England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that
he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of
a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's
mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany,
and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has
strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got
the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report
of Belgian Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without
Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's
neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were
marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been
made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German
Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized,
Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and
that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her
enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at
Liege that put this important railway centre commanding the railway
connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the
English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the
first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and
French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of
the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be
presumed that the conference between British and French experts was
unknown to the British Military Attache in Brussels. It is furthermore
impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of
British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in
Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French
authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron
Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by
approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This
disposes of the contention that the B