elgian conversation had a purely
defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness
of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all
Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that
Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans
against the French and the English, and the truth had become known
only three full months later, when the Belgian "Gray Book" was
published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While
Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was
secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered
unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of
the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down
diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof
that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This
proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the
Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he
had no regret that it violated international law. This law of
necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent
statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international
law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130,
Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning
Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed
that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass
laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that
circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the
country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected
events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to
strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered
in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of
the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the
power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived
without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.

Summary of the Secret Documents

I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, to the Minister of War,