ould be attacked_, the sending of about 100,000
troops was provided for."

He (the British Military Attache) proceeded in the following terms:

"The landing of the British troops would take place on the French
coast.... The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only
_after the violation of our (Belgian) neutrality by Germany_."

It almost seems as if Col. Barnardiston had foreseen the future.

The document continues as follows: "My visitor laid emphasis on the
following fact: that it (the conversation) was not binding on his
Government ... and that he did not know whether the opinion of his
Sovereign had been consulted." It was thus clearly shown by the
British Military Attache that his communication was simply a
conversation; it is, moreover, perfectly well known that Military
Attaches have no power to make conventional agreements.

The document further continues: "In the course of another interview,
Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take
place in the event of a _German offensive_, with Antwerp as its
object, _and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching
through our (Belgian) country_, in order to reach the French
Ardennes"--an additional proof that the object of the conversation was
solely to prevent a violation of Belgian neutrality.

Document No. 2 refers to a conversation between the British Military
Attache and Gen. Jungbluth, in which the former said that the British
troops would effect a landing "even if we (the Belgians) did not ask
for assistance." This is an additional proof that no agreement or
convention had been made.

To this the Belgian General replied that "our (Belgium's) consent was
necessary," and he added that "we (the Belgians) were, moreover,
perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium,"
thus showing his anxiety to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.

Dr. B. Dernburg claims that England would have sent troops into
Belgium in any event, even if Germany had not invaded Belgium.
Affirmations which are not based upon any evidence cannot destroy the
text itself of the documents.

In a letter of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
England, addressed to the British Minister to Belgium, on the 7th of
April, 1913, the British statesman declares in the most formal way,
that: "As long as Belgium's neutrality was not violated by any other
power, we (the British) should certainly not send troops ourselves
int