ys Holland does seem to hold the key to the present
situation.

It is clear that whatever fears may have been felt for the integrity
of Holland at the beginning of the war must now be very much abated.
The risk of Germany attacking Holland diminishes with each day of
German failure, and the whole case and righteousness of the Allies
rests upon their respect for Holland. Holland's position as regards
Germany now is extraordinarily strong materially, and as regards the
Allies it is overwhelmingly strong morally. She has behaved patiently
and sanely through a trying crisis. She has endured much almost
inevitable provocation and temptation with dignity and honesty. Were
she now subjected to any German outrage she could strike with her
excellent army of 400,000 men at Aix-la-Chapelle, and turn repulse
into rapid disaster.

That is the interesting thing about the Dutch position now. The Dutch
hold a sword at the back of Germany. Were they to come into the war on
the German side, they would, no doubt, provide a most effective but
certainly not a decisive reinforcement to the German western front,
but they would also lay open a convenient way for the Allies to the
vital part of Germany, Westphalia. But were they to come in on the
side of the Allies they would at once deliver a conclusive blow. They
could cut the main communications of the German army in Flanders, they
could round up and assist to capture a very large portion of the
German western forces, and they could open the road not only to attack
but to turn the Rhine defenses. In fact, they could finish Germany.

This situation is already fairly obvious; I betray no strategic
secret; it must become manifest to every Dutchman before many more
weeks. One has but to look at the map. Every day now diminishes the
possibility of Germany being able to make any effective
counterattack, any Belgian destruction, in Holland, and every day
increases the weight of the blow that Holland may deliver. What are
the chances that Holland may not ultimately realize to the full the
possibilities of that blow and join the Allies?

Against her doing so is the consideration that she is doing very well
as she is. She keeps her freedom. Practically the Allies fight to
secure it for her. The dread of Germanization which has hung over
Holland for forty years seems to recede.

And, of course, as a secondary restraining force there is the
reasonable fear of devastation. The "good German" vindict