demands of the Ukrainian cities had to be met, and there was in
many cases a state of real famine there; then came the Ukrainian
and finally the very considerable contingents of German and
Austro-Hungarian armies of occupation. Not until supplies for
these groups had been assured would the Ukrainian Government allow
any export of grain, and to this we were forced to agree.

It was at once evident that the degree of cultivation throughout
the whole country had seriously declined--owing to the entire
uncertainty of property and rights after the agrarian revolution.
The local authorities, affected by this state of things, were
little inclined to agree to export, and it actually came to local
embargoes, one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to
any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.

In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which
had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of
the German military defeats, was most seriously felt. The position
of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was
unusually weak. Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements
throughout the whole country were now working with increasing
success against our organisation. All this rendered the work more
difficult in September and October--and then came the collapse.

The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had
either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube,
or straight through Galicia. For this we often lacked sufficient
wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition,
often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways,
incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.

However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much
the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have
contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing
of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may
nevertheless maintain that _all that was humanly possible_ was
done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered. And
in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and
experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were
utilised to the utmost degree.

Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import
organisation--apart from the before-mentioned interference of the