Russia, and will lead to an easy and complete
success for the Central Powers. That we lay down the frontier
rectification as _conditio sine qua non_ forms a justifiable
measure to protect an important interest for the Monarchy of a
purely defensive nature. It is energetically demanded by the
entire patriotic public opinion of Hungary. It appears out of the
question that a Minister of Foreign Affairs, had he taken up
another attitude in the matter, would have been able to remain in
the Delegation.

And, besides, the procedure--to which the greatest importance must
be attached--is absolutely necessary in order not to compromise
the chances of a general peace.

It is obvious from the public statements of leading statesmen of
the Western Powers that they will not be prevailed upon to agree
to an acceptable peace, as they do not believe in our capacity and
firm resolve to carry it out. Whatever confirms their views in
this respect widens the distance between us and peace; the only
way to bring us really nearer to peace is to adopt an attitude
that will lead them to think differently.

This must constitute the line of action in our resolves and
undertakings. In connection with the Roumanian peace, it is
evident that to yield on the frontier question--even for fear of a
breakdown in the negotiations--must have a deplorable effect on
the opinion our enemies have of us. It would certainly be right
not to take advantage of Roumania's desperate situation, but to
grant her reasonable peace terms in accordance with the
principles embodied in our statements. But if we do not act with
adequate firmness on that reasonable basis we shall encourage the
Western Powers in the belief that it is not necessary to conclude
a peace with us on the basis of the integrity of our territory and
sovereignty, and fierce and bitter fighting may be looked for to
teach them otherwise.

TISZA.

_February 27, 1916._

Andrassy and Wekerle were also opposed to a milder treatment of
Roumania, and thus the whole Hungarian Parliament were of one accord
on the question. I am not sure what standpoint Karolyi held, and I do
not know if at that period the "tiger soul" which he at one time
displayed to Roumania, or the pacifist soul which he laid later at the
feet of General Franchet d'Esperey, dominated.

Thus at Brest-Litovsk, when the Roumanian peace appeared on the
horizon, I took up t