ting that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these
waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any
responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all
occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels
encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the
Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and
Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any
action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian
warships.

After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it
need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as
a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the
destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that
its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from
further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great
Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally
effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered
traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of
isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of
permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of
war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human
control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all
in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the
blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly
attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those
waters._

To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance
given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and
renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor
qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31,
1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government
will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to
the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the
pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full
sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself
compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain
areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its
opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be
followed, but rat