n was given to them. By way of
compensation, they asked not only for that stretch of land which they
had ceded to Bulgaria on their entry into the war (Adrianople), but
also a considerable area beyond.

In the numerous conferences at which the question was discussed,
Kuehlmann and I played the part of honest mediators who were making
every effort to reconcile the two so divergent standpoints. We both
saw clearly that the falling off of the Bulgars or Turks might be the
result if a compromise was not effected. Finally, after much trouble,
we succeeded in drawing up a programme acceptable to both sides. It
took this form: That "old" Dobrudsha should at once be given back to
Bulgaria, and the other parts of the area to be handed over as a
possession to the combined Central Powers, and a definite decision
agreed upon later.

Neither Turkey nor Bulgaria was quite satisfied with the decision, nor
yet averse to it; but, in the circumstances, it was the only possible
way of building a bridge between the Turks and the Bulgars.

Just as England and France secured the entry into the war of Italy
through the Treaty of London, so did the Emperor Francis Joseph and
Burian, as well as the Government in Berlin, give binding promises to
the Bulgars to secure their co-operation, and these promises proved
later to be the greatest obstacles to a peace of understanding.
Nevertheless, no sensible person can deny that it is natural that a
state engaged in a life-and-death struggle should seek an ally without
first asking whether the keeping of a promise later will give rise to
important or minor difficulties. The fireman extinguishing flames in a
burning house does not first ask whether the water he pumps on it has
damaged anything. When Roumania attacked us in the rear the danger was
very great, the house was in flames, and the first act of my
predecessor was naturally, and properly, to avert the great danger.
There was no lack of promises, and the Dobrudsha was assigned to the
Bulgarians. Whether and in what degree the Turks had a right, through
promises, to the territory they, on their part, had ceded to the
Bulgars I do not know. But they certainly had a moral right to it.

On the occasion of the Roumanian peace in the spring of 1918, too
severe a test of the loyalty of Bulgars and Turks to the alliance was
dangerous. For some time past the former had been dealing in secret
with the Entente. The alliance with Turkey rested mainly on T