ch, to the very last
moment, was all for war.

While at Brest-Litovsk I began to get into touch with the leaders of
the Hungarian Parliament in order to come to an agreement on the peace
aims relating to Roumania. It was evident that, as regards Roumania, a
peace without annexations would be more difficult to bring about than
with any other state, because the treacherous attack by the Roumanians
on the whole of Hungary had raised the desire for a better strategical
frontier. As might be expected, I met with violent opposition from
Hungary, where, under the name of strategical frontier rectifications,
as a matter of fact greater annexations were desired. The first person
with whom I dealt was Stephen Tisza, who, at great trouble, was
brought to modify his original standpoint and finally was led so far
as to admit that the fundamental ideas for peace were capable of
acceptance. On February 27, 1918, he handed me a _pro-memoria_ with
the request to show it to the Emperor, in which he explained his
already more conciliatory point of view, though, nevertheless, he very
distinctly showed his disapproval of my intentions. The _pro-memoria_
reads as follows:

Unfortunately, Roumania can withdraw from the war not as much
exhausted as justice and the justified interests of the Monarchy
could wish.

The loss of the Dobrudsha will be made good by territorial gains
in Bessarabia, while the frontier rectifications demanded by us
are out of all proportion with Roumania's guilt and with her
military situation.

Our peace terms are so mild that they are as a generous gift
offered to vanquished Roumania and are _not at all to be made a
subject for negotiations_. In no case are these negotiations to
assume the character of trading or bargaining. If Roumania refuses
to conclude peace on the basis laid down by us our answer can only
be a resumption of hostilities.

I consider it highly probable that the Roumanian Government will
run that risk to prove her necessity in the eyes of the Western
Powers and her own population. But it is just as probable that
after breaking off negotiations she will just as quickly turn back
and give way before our superior forces.

At the worst a short campaign would result in the total collapse
of Roumania.

In all human probability it is almost certain that the development
of affairs will take a course similar to the last phase in the
peace with Northern