eculative interest in property cannot have
the same concern for its permanent value and prosperity as those who
hold it as a permanent investment. Many of the railroad abuses of the
past had their origin in the law permitting the bonding of railroad
property. Were it desirable to make a property for the sole use and
convenience of speculators and gamblers, a better scheme could hardly be
devised than the present system of our railroad organizations. Were
railroad companies organized like national banks, were each shareholder
required to pay the full amount of the face value of his shares, and
were mortgaging railroad property entirely prohibited, it is not likely
that the proportion of bankrupted railroads would be any larger than
that of bankrupted banks. Few, if any, railroads would be built for
purely speculative or blackmailing purposes.

Capital is naturally conservative, and speculation is only invited where
the chances of gain are greatly out of proportion to the capital
invested. Were the principle of ownership which applies to national
banks and other well regulated corporations also applied to the
railroads, and were bonds entirely abolished, only such persons would
by the shareholders be placed in charge of their property as could give
to them the best assurance of honest and conservative management. Such a
change would greatly increase public confidence in, and the value of,
railroad securities, and would eventually place them above bank stock as
desirable investments. With the great fluctuations which under present
circumstances obtain in railroad stocks, these securities are regarded
as unsafe and unsatisfactory investments by conservative people. During
a period of less than twelve months in 1891 and 1892 the stock of the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe fluctuated from 28-1/2 to 43-1/2, or 53
per cent.; that of the Chesapeake and Ohio from 15-1/4 to 25-7/8, or 70
per cent.; of the Chicago and Northwestern from 101 to 118, or 17 per
cent.; of the Chicago, Saint Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha from 20-1/2 to
38-1/2, or 88 per cent.; of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul from
48-3/4 to 78-1/2, or 61 per cent.; of the Iowa Central from 6-1/2 to 13,
or 100 per cent.

If we look over the stock quotations of the past ten or twelve years we
find still greater fluctuations. The following table, taken from the
_United States Investor_, shows the range of prices of a few of the
principal stocks during this period: