Name. Lowest. Highest.

Central Pacific 26-1/2 (1888) 102-7/8 (1881)
Chesapeake and Ohio 1 (1888) 33-7/8 (1881)
Erie 9-1/4 (1885) 52-7/8 (1881)
Illinois Central 79-1/4 (1879) 150-1/2 (1882)
Lake Erie and Western 1-3/8 (1885) 65-3/4 (1881)
Michigan Central 46-1/2 (1885) 130-1/8 (1880)
New Jersey Central 31 (1885) 131 (1889)
New York Central 81-3/4 (1885) 155-3/8 (1880)
Northern Pacific 14 (1884) 54-3/8 (1882)
Rock Island 63-3/8 (1891) 204 (1880)
C., M. & St. P. 34-3/8 (1879) 129-1/4 (1881)
Texas and Pacific 5-1/2 (1884) 73-5/8 (1881)
Wabash 2 (1885) 60 (1881)
Atchison and Topeka 23-3/4 (1890) 152-1/2 (1880)
Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy 75-7/8 (1891) 182-1/2 (1881)
N. Y. & N. E. 9 (1884) 86 (1881)
Wisconsin Central 2 (1880) 39 (1881)
Union Pacific 28 (1884) 131 (1881)

And such fluctuations have always been rather the rule than the
exception. It is a gross outrage upon the investing public to let this
state of affairs continue. It should be corrected without delay.

How many high officials in charge of railroad property will under these
circumstances resist the temptation to speculate in the stock of their
companies, and, so long as it is permitted, how many will resist the
temptation to adopt such policies in the government of their roads as
will cause such fluctuations? It is a common report that it is not an
unfrequent occurrence for Senators and members of Congress to receive
information from railway officials that enables them to raise their
campaign funds by speculation in Wall Street.

Mr. Henry C. Adams, statistician of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
says in his third annual report:

"It certainly appears ... that the motive for ownership in
railroad stock is quite different from the ordinary motives
which lead men to invest in corporate enterprises, thus
presenting an additional proof that railways are a business
not subject to ordinary business rules."

There is no safer business in the world than railroad transportation;
there is none that has less elements of uncertainty;