e has only to dare and
he will be successful."[83] It was to be Sir George's unhappy lot, a
year later, to goad the British naval commander on Lake Champlain into
premature action; and there was ample time for the present indiscreet
innuendo to reach Barclay, and impel him to a step which Prevost
afterwards condemned as hasty, because not awaiting the arrival of a
body of fifty seamen announced to be at Kingston on their way to
Malden.

At sunrise of September 10, the lookout at the masthead of the
"Lawrence" sighted the British squadron in the northwest. Barclay was
on his way down the lake, intending to fight. The wind was southwest,
fair for the British, but adverse to the Americans quitting the harbor
by the channel leading towards the enemy. Fortunately it shifted to
southeast, and there steadied; which not only enabled them to go out,
but gave them the windward position throughout the engagement. The
windward position, or weather gage, as it was commonly called,
conferred the power of initiative; whereas the vessel or fleet to
leeward, while it might by skill at times force action, or itself
obtain the weather gage by manoeuvring, was commonly obliged to await
attack and accept the distance chosen by the opponent. Where the
principal force of a squadron, as in Perry's case, consists in two
vessels armed almost entirely with carronades, the importance of
getting within carronade range is apparent.

Looking forward to a meeting, Perry had prearranged the disposition of
his vessels to conform to that which he expected the enemy to assume.
Unlike ocean fleets, all the lake squadrons, as is already known of
Ontario, were composed of vessels very heterogeneous in character.
This was because the most had been bought, not designed for the navy.
It was antecedently probable, therefore, that a certain general
principle would dictate the constitution of the three parts of the
order of battle, the centre and two flanks, into which every military
line divides. The French have an expression for the centre,--_corps de
bataille_,--which was particularly appropriate to squadrons like those
of Barclay and Perry. Each had a natural "body of battle," in vessels
decisively stronger than all the others combined. This relatively
powerful division would take the centre, as a cohesive force, to
prevent the two ends--or flanks--being driven asunder by the enemy.
Barclay's vessels of this class were the new ship, "Detroit," and the
"Quee