ion which determined victory. The influence
of the rear gunboats brought up by Elliott was contributive, but not
decisive.

In short, the campaign of Lake Erie was brought to an immediate
successful issue by the ready initiative taken by Perry when he found
the British distant fire more destructive than he expected, and by his
instant acceptance of necessary risk, in standing down exposed to a
raking cannonade to which he for a long while could not reply. If, as
the author holds, he was entitled to expect prompt imitation by the
"Niagara," the risk was actual, but not undue. As it was, though the
"Lawrence" surrendered, it was not until she had, with the help of
gunboats stationed by Perry for that object, so damaged both her
opponents that they were incapable of further resistance. In the
tactical management of the "Lawrence" and her supports was no mere
headlong dash, but preparation adequate to conditions. Had the
"Niagara" followed, the "Lawrence" need never have struck. The
contemporary incidents on Erie and Ontario afford an instructive
commentary upon Napoleon's incisive irony, that "War cannot be waged
without running risks." There has been sufficient quotation from
Chauncey to indicate why the campaign on Ontario dragged through two
seasons, and then left the enemy in control. Small as the scale and
the theatre of these naval operations, they illustrate the unvarying
lesson that only in offensive action can defensive security be found.

The destruction of the British naval force decided the campaign in the
Northwest by transferring the control of the water. Its general
military results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to
modify them during the rest of the war. Detroit and Michigan territory
fell back into the hands of the United States; and the allegiance of
the Indians to the British cause, procured by Brock's sagacious daring
a twelvemonth before, but rudely shaken by the events narrated, was
destroyed by the death of their great leader, Tecumseh, a month later
in the battle of the Thames, itself the direct consequence of Perry's
success. The frontier was henceforth free from the Indian terror,
which had hitherto disquieted it from the Maumee to Cleveland.

A more far-reaching political issue was also here definitely settled.
A sense of having betrayed the Indian interests in the previous
treaties of 1783 and 1794 was prevalent in British official circles,
and in their counsels a scheme had bee