n circulated for constituting an
independent Indian territory, under joint guarantee of the two
nations, between their several dominions. This would be locally within
the boundaries of the United States; the sole jurisdiction of which
was thus to be limited and trammelled, because open to continual
British representation and reclamation, based upon treaty
stipulations.[102] This infringement upon the perfect sovereignty of
the nation inside its own borders, in favor of savage communities and
under foreign guarantee, was one of the propositions formally brought
forward as a _sine qua non_ by the British negotiators at Ghent.
Although by that time the United States stood alone face to face with
Great Britain, at whose full disposal were now the veterans of the
Peninsular War, and the gigantic navy, which the abdication of
Napoleon had released from all other opponents, the American
commissioners refused with dignity to receive the proposition even for
reference. "It is not necessary," they replied, "to refer such demands
to the American Government for its instructions. They will only be a
fit subject for deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon
the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence."[103]

The envoys of the United States were able to be firm, because secure
of indignant support by their people; but it is beyond question that
two naval victories had arrayed upon their side, at the moment, the
preponderance of military argument, which weighs so heavily in
treaties of peace. New Orleans was yet in the future, with adverse
chances apparent; but, owing to the victory of Perry, the United
States was in firm military tenure of the territory, the virtual
cession of which was thus demanded. A year after Perry, McDonough's
equally complete success on Lake Champlain, by insuring control of the
water route for invasion, rolled back the army of Peninsular veterans
under Prevost, at a season of the year which forbade all hope of
renewing the enterprise until another spring. Great Britain was too
eager to end twenty years of continued war to brook further delay. The
lake campaigns of 1813 and 1814 thus emphasized the teaching of
history as to the influence of control of the water upon the course of
events; and they illustrate also the too often forgotten truth, that
it is not by brilliant individual feats of gallantry or skill, by
ships or men, but by the massing of superior forces, that military