the refutation ([Greek: tou elenchou
agnoia]), is simply arguing beside the point, distracting the
attention by irrelevant considerations. It often succeeds by proving
some other conclusion which is not the one in dispute, but has a
superficial resemblance to it, or is more or less remotely connected
with it.
It is easier to explain what these fallacies consist in than to
illustrate them convincingly. It is chiefly in long arguments that the
mischief is done. "A Fallacy," says Whately, "which when stated barely
in a few sentences would not deceive a child, may deceive half the
world if diluted in a quarto volume." Very rarely is a series of
propositions put before us in regular form and order, all bearing on
a definite point. A certain conclusion is in dispute, not very
definitely formulated perhaps, and a mixed host of considerations
are tumbled out before us. If we were perfectly clear-headed persons,
capable of protracted concentration of attention, incapable
of bewilderment, always on the alert, never in a hurry, never
over-excited, absolutely without prejudice, we should keep our
attention fixed upon two things while listening to an argument, the
point to be proved, and the necessary premisses. We should hold
the point clearly in our minds, and watch indefatigably for the
corroborating propositions. But none of us being capable of this, all
of us being subject to bewilderment by a rapid whirl of statements,
and all of us biased more or less for or against a conclusion, the
sophist has facilities for doing two things--taking for granted
that he has stated the required premisses (_petitio principii_), and
proving to perfect demonstration something which is not the point
in dispute, but which we are willing to mistake for it (_ignoratio
elenchi_).
It is chiefly in the heat of argument that either Petitio or Ignoratio
succeeds. When a fallacy continues to perplex us in cold blood, it
must have in its favour either some deeply-rooted prejudice or some
peculiar intricacy in the language used, or some abstruseness in the
matter. If we are not familiar with the matter of the argument, and
have but a vague hold of the words employed, we are, of course, much
more easily imposed upon.
The famous Sophisms of antiquity show the fascination exercised over
us by proving something, no matter how irrelevant. If certain steps
in an argument are sound, we seem to be fascinated by them so that we
cannot apply our minds to the
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