with this conception of inference to the unobserved
as the only true inference, and with an empirical law--a generality
extended from observed cases to unobserved--as the type of such
inference, Mill saw his way to connecting a new Logic with the old. We
must examine this junction carefully, and the brilliant and plausible
arguments by which he supported it; we shall find that, biased by this
desire to connect the new with the old, he gave a misleading dialectic
setting to his propositions, and, in effect, confused the principles
of Argumentative conclusion on the one hand and of Scientific
Observation and Inference on the other. The conception of Inference
which he adopted from Whately was too narrow on both sides for the
uses to which he put it. Be it understood that in the central methods
both of Syllogistic and of Science, Mill was substantially in accord
with tradition; it is in his mode of junction, and the light thereby
thrown upon the ends and aims of both, that he is most open to
criticism.

As regards the relation between Deduction and Induction, Mill's chief
proposition was the brilliant paradox that all inference is at bottom
Inductive, that Deduction is only a partial and accidental stage in
a process the whole of which may be called Induction. An opinion was
abroad--fostered by the apparently exclusive devotion of Logic to
Deduction--that all inference is essentially Deductive. Not so,
answered Mill, meeting this extreme with another: all inference is
essentially Inductive. He arrives at this through the conception
that Induction is a generalisation from observed particulars, while
Deduction is merely the extension of the generalisation to a new
case, a new particular. The example that he used will make his meaning
plain.

Take a common Syllogism:--

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Socrates is mortal.

"The proposition," Mill says, "that Socrates is mortal is evidently an
inference. It is got at as a conclusion from something else. But do we
in reality conclude it from the proposition, All men are mortal?" He
answers that this cannot be, because if it is not true that Socrates
is mortal it cannot be true that all men are mortal. It is clear that
our belief in the mortality of Socrates must rest on the same ground
as our belief in the mortality of men in general. He goes on to ask
whence we derive our knowledge of the general truth, and answers: "Of
course from observation. Now all which