whole class? This tacit assumption, he contended, is really at the
bottom of the Enthymeme, and its proper completion is to take this as
the Major Premiss, with the enumeration of individuals as the Minor.
Thus:--

What belongs to the individuals examined belongs to
the whole class.

The property of the ruminating belongs to the individuals
examined, ox, sheep, goat, etc.

_Therefore_, it belongs to all.

In answer to this, Hamilton repeated the traditional view, treating
Whately's view merely as an instance of the prevailing ignorance of
the history of Logic. He pointed out besides that Whately's Major was
the postulate of a different kind of inference from that contemplated
in Aristotle's Inductive Syllogism, Material as distinguished from
Formal inference. This is undeniable if we take this syllogism purely
as an argumentative syllogism. The "all" of the conclusion simply
covers the individuals enumerated and admitted to be "all" in the
Minor Premiss. If a disputant admits the cases produced to be all and
can produce none to the contrary, he is bound to admit the conclusion.
Now the inference contemplated by Whately was not inference from
an admission to what it implies, but inference from a series of
observations to all of a like kind, observed and unobserved.

It is not worth while discussing what historical justification Whately
had for his view of Induction. It is at least arguable that the word
had come to mean, if it did not mean with Aristotle himself, more
than a mere summation of particulars in a general statement. Even
Aristotle's respondent in the concession of his Minor admitted that
the individuals enumerated constituted all in the truly general sense,
not merely all observed but all beyond the range of observation. The
point, however, is insignificant. What really signifies is that
while Hamilton, after drawing the line between Formal Induction and
Material, fell back and entrenched himself within that line, Mill
caught up Whately's conception of Induction, pushed forward, and made
it the basis of his System of Logic.

In Mill's definition, the mere summation of particulars, _Inductio per
enumerationem simplicem ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria_,
is Induction improperly so called. The only process worthy of the name
is Material Induction, inference to the unobserved. Here only is
there an advance from the known to the unknown, a veritable "inductive
hazard".

Starting then