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erved uniformities of nature will continue. Such an observed uniformity--that All animals have a nervous system, that All animals die, that Quinine cures ague--is also called an Empirical Law. But while we are justified in extending an empirical law beyond the limits within which it has been observed to hold good, it is a mistake to suppose that the main work of science is the collection of empirical laws, and that the only scientific inference is the inference from the observed prevalence of an empirical law to its continuance. With science the collection of empirical laws is only a preliminary: "the goal of science," in Herschel's phrase, "is explanation". In giving such prominence to empirical laws in his theory, Mill confined Induction to a narrower scope than science ascribes to it. Science aims at reaching "the causes of things": it tries to penetrate behind observed uniformities to the explanation of them. In fact, as long as a science consists only of observed uniformities, as long as it is in the empirical stage, it is a science only by courtesy. Astronomy was in this stage before the discovery of the Law of Gravitation. Medicine is merely empirical as long as its practice rests upon such generalisations as that Quinine cures ague, without knowing why. It is true that this explanation may consist only in the discovery of a higher or deeper uniformity, a more recondite law of connexion: the point is that these deeper laws are not always open to observation, and that the method of reaching them is not merely observing and recording. In the body of his Inductive Logic, Mill gave a sufficient account of the Method of Explanation as practised in scientific inquiry. It was only his mode of approaching the subject that was confusing, and made it appear as if the proper work of science were merely extending observed generalities, as when we conclude that all men will die because all men have died, or that all horned animals ruminate because all hitherto observed have had this attribute. A minor source of confusion incident to the same controversy was his refusing the title of Induction proper to a mere summary of particulars. He seemed thereby to cast a slight upon the mere summation of particulars. And yet, according to his theory, it was those particulars that were the basis of the Induction properly so called. That all men will die is an inference from the observation summed up in the proposition that all men h
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