FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244  
245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   >>   >|  
y (p. 159) detailed to permit intelligent, effective planning," he passed along without comment the criticisms of his subordinates. He was opposed to the formation of a special staff group. "We must soon reach the point," he wrote, "where our general staff must be able to cope with such problems without the formation of ad hoc committees or groups."[6-13] [Footnote 6-12: For examples of this extensive review of the Gillem Board Report in G-1, see the following Memos: Col J. F. Cassidy (Exec Office, G-1) for Col Parks, 10 Dec 45; Chief, Officer Branch, G-1, for Exec Off, G-1 Policy Group, 14 Dec 45; Actg Chief, Req and Res Br, for Chief, Policy Control Group, 14 Dec 45; Lt Col E. B. Jones, Special Projects Br, for G-1, 19 and 21 Dec 45, sub: Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in Post-War Army. All in WDGAP 291.2.] [Footnote 6-13: Memo, Gen Paul, G-1, for CofS, 27 Dec 45, sub: Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in Post-War Army, WDGAP 291.2 (24 Nov 45).] The Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization and Training, G-3, Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, was chiefly concerned with the timing of the new policy. In trying to employ black manpower on a broader professional scale, he warned, the Army must recognize the "ineptitude and limited capacity of the Negro soldier." He wanted various phases of the new policy timed "with due consideration for all factors such as public opinion, military requirements and the military situation." If the priority given public opinion in the sequence of these factors reflected Edwards's view of their importance, the list is somewhat curious. Edwards concurred in the recommendations, although he wanted the special staff group established in the personnel office rather than in his organization, and he rejected any arbitrary percentage of black officers. More black officers could be obtained through expansion of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, he suggested, but he rejected the board's call for special classification of all enlistees in reception and training centers, on grounds that the centers were not adequate for the task.[6-14] [Footnote 6-14: G-3 Summary Sheet to ADCofS, 2 Jan 46, sub:
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   220   221   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232   233   234   235   236   237   238   239   240   241   242   243   244  
245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
Policy
 

special

 
Footnote
 

Edwards

 
Utilization
 

opinion

 

public

 
factors
 

military

 

centers


officers
 

rejected

 

wanted

 

Training

 

policy

 
Manpower
 

formation

 
sequence
 
curious
 

priority


situation

 

importance

 

detailed

 

reflected

 

intelligent

 

soldier

 

capacity

 

limited

 

warned

 

recognize


ineptitude
 

phases

 

effective

 
concurred
 

permit

 

planning

 

consideration

 

passed

 
requirements
 
reception

training

 

grounds

 
enlistees
 

classification

 

ADCofS

 

Summary

 

adequate

 

suggested

 

organization

 

office