d, must "be
implemented _promptly ... must_ be objective by nature ... must (p. 156)
eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special
consideration based on race ... and should point towards the immediate
objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of individual
merit and ability."

The board made eighteen specific recommendations, of which the
following were the most important.

"That combat and service units be organized and activated from the
Negro manpower available in the postwar Army to meet the requirements
of training and expansion and in addition qualified individuals be
utilized in appropriate special and overhead units." The use of
qualified Negroes in overhead units was the first break with the
traditional policy of segregation, for though black enlisted men would
continue to eat and sleep in segregated messes and barracks, they
would work alongside white soldiers and perform the same kind of duty
in the same unit.

"The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil
population be the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the
postwar Army."[6-9]

[Footnote 6-9: The 10 percent quota that eventually
emerged from the Gillem Board was an approximation;
Gillem later recalled that the World War II
enlisted ratio was nearer 9.5 percent, but that
General Eisenhower, the Chief of Staff, saying he
could not remember that, suggested making it "an
even 10 percent." See Interv, Osur with Gillem.]

"That Negro units organized or activated for the postwar Army conform
in general to other units of the postwar Army but the maximum strength
of type [sic] units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or
comparable organization." Here the board wanted the Army to avoid the
division-size units of World War II but retain separate black units
which would be diversified enough to broaden the professional base of
Negroes in the Regular Army by offering them a larger selection of
military occupations.

"That in the event of universal training in peacetime additional
officer supervision is supplied to units which have a greater than
normal percentage of personnel falling into A.G.C.T. classifications
IV and V." Such a policy had existed in World War II, but was never
carried out.

"That a staff group of selected officers whose background has inc