commendations on the use of black
troops. The board declared that its recommendations were based on two
complementary principles: black Americans had a constitutional right
to fight, and the Army had an obligation to make the most effective
use of every soldier. But the board also took into account reports of
the Army's wartime experience with black units. It referred constantly
to this experience, citing the satisfactory performance of the black
service units and some of the smaller black combat units, in
particular the artillery and tank battalions. It also described the
black infantry platoons integrated into white companies in Europe as
"eminently successful." At the same time large black combat units had
not been satisfactory, most often because their junior officers and
noncommissioned officers lacked the ability to lead. The difficulties
the Army encountered in properly placing its black troops during the
war, the board decided, stemmed to some extent from inadequate staff
work and improper planning. Poor staff work allowed a disproportionate
number of Negroes with low test scores to be allocated to combat
elements. Lack of early planning, constant reorganization and
regrouping of black units, and continuous shifting of individuals from
one type of training to another had confused and bewildered black
troops, who sometimes doubted that the Army intended to commit them to
combat at all.

[Footnote 6-8: Memo, Gillem for CofS, 17 Nov 45, sub:
Report of Board of General Officers on the
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army.
Unless otherwise noted this section is based on the
report.]

It was necessary, the board declared, to avoid repetition of this
experience. Advance planning was needed to develop a broader base of
trained men among black troops to provide cadres and leaders to meet
national emergencies more efficiently. The Army had to realize and
take advantage of the advances made by Negroes in education, industry,
and government service. The wide range of skills attained by Negroes
had enhanced their military value and made possible a broader
selectivity with consequent benefit to military efficiency. Thus, the
Army had to adopt a racial policy that provided for the progressive
and flexible use of black manpower "within proportions corresponding
to those in the civilian population." This policy, it adde