commended a single measure of performance for officers and a single
system for promotion, even if this system reduced promotions for black
officers. Promotions on any basis other than merit, he concluded,
deprived the Army of the best leadership and inflicted weak commanders
on black units.

Table 2--AGCT Percentages in Selected World War II Divisions

Unit I II III IV V Total
(130 +) (110-120) (90-109) (60-89) (0-59)

11th Armored
Division....... 3.0 23.8 33.8 33.1 6.3 100
35th Infantry
Division....... 3.3 27.0 34.2 28.0 7.5 100
92d Infantry
Division (Negro) 0.4 5.2 11.8 43.5 39.1 100
93d Infantry
Division (Negro) 0.1 3.5 13.0 38.4 45.0 100
100th Infantry
Division........ 3.6 27.1 34.1 29.1 6.1 100

_Source_: Tables submitted by The Adjutant General to the Gillem
Board, 1945.

Gibson was not trying to magnify the efficiency of segregated (p. 138)
units. He made a special effort to compare the performance of the 92d
Division with that of the integrated black platoons in Germany because
such a comparison would demonstrate, he believed, that the Army's
segregation policy was in need of critical reexamination. He cited
"many officers" who believed that the problems connected with large
segregated combat units justified their abolition in favor of the
integration of black platoons into larger white units. Although such
unit integration would not abolish segregation completely, Gibson
concluded, it would permit the Army to use men and small units on the
basis of ability alone.[5-42]

[Footnote 5-42: Memo, Gibson for ASW, 23 Apr 45, sub:
Report of Visit to MTO and ETO, ASW 291.2 (NT); see
also Interv, Bell I. Wiley with Truman K. Gibson,
Civilian Aide to Secretary of War, 30 May 45, CMH
files.]

The flexibility Gibson detected among many Army officers was not
apparent in the answers to the McCloy questionnaire that flowed into
the War Department during the summer and fall of 1945. With few
exceptions, the senior officers queried expressed uniform reactions.
They reiterated a story of frustration and difficulty in training and
employing black units, characterized black soldiers as unreliabl