d generation to
them both.

Moreover, they say that subsistence and matter are subject to qualities,
and do so in a manner define them; and again, they make the qualities to
be also bodies. But these things have much perplexity. For if qualities
have a peculiar substance, for which they both are and are called
bodies, they need no other substance; for they have one of their own.
But if they have under them in common only that which the Stoic school
calls essence and matter, it is manifest they do but participate of the
body; for they are not bodies. But the subject and recipient must of
necessity differ from those things which it receives and to which it is
subject. But these men see by halves; for they say indeed that matter
is void of quality, but they will not call qualities immaterial. Now how
can they make a body without quality, who understand no quality without
a body? For the reason which joins a body to all quality suffers not
the understanding to comprehend any body without some quality. Either,
therefore, he who oppugns incorporeal quality seems also to oppugn
unqualified matter; or separating the one from the other, he mutually
parts them both. As for the reason which some pretend, that matter is
called unqualified not because it is void of all quality, but because
it has all qualities, it is most of all against sense. For no man calls
that unqualified which is capable of every quality, nor that impassible
which is by nature always apt to suffer all things, nor that immovable
which is moved every way. And this doubt is not solved, that, however
matter is always understood with quality, yet it is understood to be
another thing and differing from quality.

END OF SIX-------------

CONTRADICTIONS OF THE STOICS.

I first lay this down for an axiom, that there ought to be seen in men's
lives an agreement with their doctrines. For it is not so necessary that
the pleader (as Aeschines has it) and the law speak one and the same
thing, as that the life of a philosopher be consonant to his speech. For
the speech of a philosopher is a law of his own and voluntarily imposed
on himself, unless they esteem philosophy to be a game, or an acuteness
in disputing invented for the gaining of applause, and not--what it
really is--a thing deserving our greatest study.

Since, then, there are in their discourses many things written by Zeno
himself, many by Cleanthes, and most of all by Chrysippus, concerning
policy,