are important: "You must unite all your men into
one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat
Hood. General Schofield is marching to-day from here. . . . "( 8)
Again, on the same date, he telegraphed: "Bear in mind my instructions
as to concentration, and not let Hood catch you in detail."( 9)

Sherman thus gave the most emphatic warning against the mistake
which Thomas nevertheless made by failing to concentrate all his
own available troops until it was too late to meet Hood's advance,
thus leaving two corps to bear the entire brunt of battle until
the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS

The following correspondence relating to the command of an army in
the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to
the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why
Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also
important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two
corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command
in person:

"Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M.
"Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received.
General Schofield is entitled to the command [over Stanley] by
virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise
you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000
men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better
for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give
confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the
rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made
from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
Also I want you to assume the offensive as quick as possible, as
I have reason to believe all of Beauregard's army is not there,
but that he has also divided his forces.

"W. T. Sherman, Major-General."(10)
On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above:

"It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops
with me in person. My object in giving the preference to General
Schofield [over Stanley] was merely that he should exercise command
should accidental circumstances prevent my presence."(11)

Sherman and Thomas were equally right--Sherman in saying "It will
be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will
give confidence"; and Thomas in replying, "